Abstract. We study a double auction environment where buyers and sellers have interdependent valuations and multiunit demand and supply. We propose a new mechanism, the groupwise-price mechanism. We show that the mechanism satisfies ex post incentive compatibility, individual rationality, feasibility, non-wastefulness, and no budget deficit.
Most common mechanisms quote a price that equates supply and demand and let the objects change hands at that price, but such mechanisms are not always incentive compatible. That is, participants sometimes have incentives to misreport their preferences.
The resulting misreporting can lead to inefficiency of equilibrium outcomes. The problem becomes even more difficult once we allow for traders with interdependent values or multiunit demand or supply, and yet these are common features for many double auction environments.
To address these problems, this paper proposes a new double auction mechanism, which we call the groupwise-price double-auction mechanisms (or simply, groupwise-price mechanisms), and show that these mechanisms satisfy desirable incentive compatibility and efficiency properties. A groupwise-price mechanism divides the entire market into a number of submarkets. Each submarket is composed of a subset of buyers and sellers, and all trades happen between buyers and sellers in the same submarket. For each submarket, we set a reference price for that submarket which is independent of reported types of agents in that submarket. Agents in the submarket trade based on the reference price, although not necessarily at it.
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The goal of our paper is to demonstrate that the groupwise-price mechanism satisfies desirable properties, which makes it a promising design for double auction markets.
Our first main result shows that, with an arbitrary number of buyers and sellers, the groupwise-price mechanism satisfies ex post incentive compatibility and ex post individual rationality. These properties make truth-telling and voluntary participation an ex post equilibrium under this mechanism. Moreover, we show that the mechanism never runs deficit, 2 and has the property that the number of objects sold by the sellers coincides with the number of objects bought by the buyers.
As is the case for other mechanisms studied in the literature, our groupwise-price mechanisms are not fully efficient. However, we establish asymptotic efficiency of this mechanism. That is, our second main result shows that the trade outcome in the mechanism
The specific manner that the trading price is determined is important for incentive compatibility.
We will defer detail to the main body of the paper, because it is rather complicated and needs formal definitions in order to describe it precisely.
2
While our groupwise-price mechanism can run surplus, it is easy to modify the mechanism to satisfy exact ex post budget balance. See footnote 15 for detail.
converges to the efficient level as in a competitive equilibrium under certain additional conditions, as the numbers of the buyers and sellers go to infinity. This result suggests that the outcome of our groupwise-price mechanism is close to a fully efficient, first-best outcome, at least in large economies.
Related Literature. Few existing studies have offered a double auction mechanism that is ex post incentive compatible and asymptotically efficient. McAfee (1992) is an important exception, who makes a seminal contribution to this problem. He considers buyers and sellers with private values and single-unit supply and demand. In that setting, he proposes a mechanism that is dominant-strategy incentive compatible (which is equivalent to ex post incentive compatibility with private values) and asymptotically efficient. Our marginal contribution over McAfee (1992) is that we allow for interdependent values and multi-unit demand and supply. Both features are important for most double auction markets in practice. In stock exchange, for instance, traders naturally trade multiple shares, and the value of any stock to a trader has strong common value component. It turns out that McAfee's mechanism (or naive extensions thereof) can handle neither of these features, and thus our mechanism is based on a different idea. In fact, even in the case with private values and single-unit demand and supply, our mechanism does not reduce to McAfee's.
In an ongoing work, Loertscher and Mezzetti (2013) consider an extension of McAfee (1992) independently from our study. They allow for multi-unit demand and supply, while sticking to the private-values assumption. They present a mechanism that is dominantstrategy incentive compatible and asymptotically efficient. One of the main advantages of our paper compared to theirs is that we allow for interdependent values. As already mentioned, interdependence is important in various double auction environments such as stock markets.
Our paper is part of the literature of mechanism design with interdependent valuations, where many existing studies have found impossibility results. For example, Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) and Jehiel et al. (2006) demonstrate the difficulties associated with interdependent values and multidimensional signals under the transferable utility setup.
Che, Kim and Kojima (2013) show that, even with single-dimensional signals, similar impossibility results are obtained in a non-transferable utility setup. In our paper, we circumvent those impossibility results by considering an environment where each agent's signal is summarized by a one-dimensional statistic with the standard single-crossing condition (Maskin, 1992; Dasgupta and Maskin, 2000) , and the agents have quasi-linear utilities.
Our work was partly inspired by a recent work by Hashimoto (2013) . 3 In an object allocation setting, he offers a general procedure to modify a given mechanism into an ex post incentive compatible one, while approximating the original mechanism in large markets. He applies his technique to construct a mechanism that is ex post incentive compatible and asymptotically efficient. While inspired by his work, our result is independent from his. The main difference is that his method presumes that the objects are collectively owned (or equivalently, initially no individual privately owns an object). As such, his modified mechanism does not necessarily guarantee the individual rationality if applied to double auction, although individual rationality is crucial in the double auction environment.
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Our groupwise-price mechanism defines prices for a subset of agents independently of their own reports, thereby preventing some obvious price-manipulation incentives. Similar ideas are used in several earlier contributions, such as Cordoba and Hammond (1998) and Kovalenkov (2002) for exchange economies, Segal (2003) for optimal pricing, and Baliga compatible. The main goal of the current study is different in that we obtain an exactly incentive compatible mechanism, but a basic motivation is similar.
Another paper related to ours is Matsushima (2008) . Although he considers double auction with interdependent values like us, his mechanism does not satisfy individual rationality because some agents earn negative payoffs with a small, but positive, probability.
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The basic idea of defining personalized or groupwise prices appears to be well-known, and the authors have been unable to locate the first to propose it. Jackson and Manelli (1997) call this type of mechanisms "folk" mechanisms.
6
To satisfy the feasibility constraint, we use a rationing rule (through an auction mechanism of Ausubel (1999)). Hence, manipulation of quantities by an agent (without affecting prices) is a relevant concern.
of traders increases in a broad class of double auction mechanisms. Important contributions in this tradition include Gresik and Satterthwaite (1989) , Rustichini, Satterthwaite and Williams (1994) , Fudenberg, Mobius and Szeidl (2007) , and Cripps and Swinkels (2006) for the private values case, and Reny and Perry (2006) for the interdependent values case. 7 The main difference between this line of research and ours is that these papers study Bayesian equilibrium behavior of the participants in mechanisms that are not necessarily ex post incentive compatible. Our motivation is to design a mechanism that is ex post incentive compatible, which makes truthtelling a best response irrespective of the participants' beliefs about others' signals. Because Bayesian equilibrium behavior of traders in most double auction mechanisms is very complicated, we believe that our mechanism may be a useful market design, which allows market participants to behave in a straightforward manner and makes participation in the market "safe" (Roth, 2008) .
As such, we believe that our paper complements the existing studies of double auctions.
More broadly, our asymptotic analysis can be situated in a long tradition of economic theory on large-market properties of mechanisms. In large exchange economies, Roberts and Postlewaite (1976) demonstrate that the Walrasian mechanism is difficult to manipulate under some conditions. Jackson (1992) and Jackson and Manelli (1997) investigate exchange economies from asymptotic perspectives as well. More recently, Roth and Peranson (1999) , Immorlica and Mahdian (2005) , Kojima and Pathak (2008) , Lee (2011), and Ashlagi, Kanoria and Leshno (2013) show that the deferred acceptance algorithm due to Gale and Shapley (1962) becomes increasingly hard to manipulate in large markets.
In object allocation setting without transfers, asymptotic incentive compatibility and asymptotic efficiency of various mechanisms have been established by Kojima and Manea (2008) , Che and Kojima (2008) , Liu and Pycia (2011) , and Azevedo and Budish (2012) .
Our paper identifies another case in which both incentive compatibility and efficiency become achievable in large economies, reinforcing the insights from these existing studies.
Model
There are a set of buyers B and a set of sellers S. Let n B , n S ∈ N be the numbers of buyers and sellers, respectively. There is one type of indivisible object, as well as divisible money.
Each agent can buy or sell at most m ∈ N units of the object. Each agent i ∈ B ∪ S is endowed with a signal, which we refer to as her type,
See also Kazumori (2013) who shows that, under interdependent values, every trembling hand perfect equilibrium asymptotically approximate ex post price taking behavior.
i's private information. Let t = (t i ) i∈B∪S denote the profile of types. Given type profile t, each agent i's value profile is (v i (t)) m =1 . For each buyer b and index ∈ {1, . . . , m}, v b (t) ∈ [0, 1] is b's valuation for the -th unit of the object. For each seller s and each ∈ {1, . . . , m}, v s (t) ∈ [0, 1] is the cost of giving up the -th unit of the object for seller s. We assume that each agent has a quasi-linear utility function. More precisely, for each buyer b, her payoff from consuming ∈ {1, . . . , m} units of the object and paying money τ ∈ R is given by
For each seller s, her payoff from giving up ∈ {1, . . . , m} units of the object and receiving money τ ∈ R is given by
For each i and , we assume that v i (·) is continuous, non-decreasing in each argument, and strictly increasing in t i . For each , we assume v b (t) > v +1 b (t) for all b ∈ B and v s (t) < v +1 s (t) for all s ∈ S. That is, buyers have diminishing marginal utility and sellers have increasing marginal cost. We also impose a single-crossing condition. More specifically, for each i, j ∈ S ∪ B, , ∈ {1, . . . , m}, and t = (
For normalization, we assume that the highest possible valuation is 1 and the lowest possible valuation is 0 (across buyers and sellers, and across units of the object).
2.1. Mechanisms and Desirable Properties. A (double auction) mechanism is a pair of functions ϕ = (ζ, τ ) from the set of type profiles to the sets of object allocations and transfers. More specifically, for each type profile t = (t i ) i∈S∪B and agent i ∈ B ∪ S, ζ i (t) ∈ {1, . . . , m} is the number of objects that i trades (so, ζ i (t) is the number of objects received if i is a buyer and the number of objects sold if i is a seller), and τ i (t) is the transfer for i (so, τ i (t) is the money that i pays if i is a buyer, and the payment that i receives if i is a seller).
In the remainder of this section, we introduce desirable properties of mechanisms. The main goal of our study is to construct a mechanism that satisfies these good properties, which we will do in the rest of the paper.
First, we introduce our central incentive compatibility concept. A mechanism ϕ = (ζ, τ ) is ex post incentive compatible if, for each t, we have
This condition requires that, given that every other agent reports her true type, reporting the true type is a best response even in the ex post sense, i.e., it is a best response even after all true types are revealed to the agent. This property provides certain robust incentives to report true types (see Bergemann and Morris (2005) for instance).
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A mechanism ϕ = (ζ, τ ) is ex post individually rational (or individually rational for short) if, for each t, we have
This is a standard condition in the literature and important for voluntary participation.
A mechanism ϕ = (ζ, τ ) is feasible if, for each t, we have
This condition requires that the number of the objects that are sold is weakly larger than the number of the objects that are bought. This ensures that the trade is feasible, as the set of the objects sold by the sellers offers enough supply to satisfy the demand by the buyers who are prescribed to buy the objects.
A mechanism ϕ = (ζ, τ ) is non-wasteful if, for each t, we have
This condition requires that the mechanism never wastes an object by buying up objects from sellers while not assigning all of these objects to buyers.
A mechanism ϕ = (ζ, τ ) runs no ex post budget deficit (or no budget deficit for short) if, for each t, we have
This condition ensures that the auction organizer never runs deficit. We regard this condition as important for the sustainability of a mechanism.
A stronger condition than no budget deficit is of some interest. A mechanism ϕ = (ζ, τ ) is ex post budget-balanced (or budget-balanced for short) if, for each t, we have
While sometimes assumed in the literature, we do not regard budget balance to be indispensable as far as the mechanism runs no budget deficit. For that reason, our group-wise price mechanism never runs a budget deficit, but can run budget surplus, violating the exact budget balance. However, we will later show that it is straightforward to modify our groupwise-price mechanism into a mechanism that satisfies the exact budget balance.
See Section 4.1 for detail.
As the first-best benchmark, we consider a (complete information) competitive equilibrium. Formally, a mechanism ϕ = (ζ, τ ) is said to be a competitive mechanism if it satisfies the following condition: For any type profile t,
and there exists p(t) such that
In other words, a competitive mechanism lets each agent buy or sell optimally given price p(t) where the price p(t) balances demand and supply. 9 From the definition it is 9 It is straightforward to see that there exists a competitive mechanism.
obvious that any competitive mechanism satisfies individual rationality, feasibility, nonwastefulness, budget balance and, perhaps most importantly, efficiency. The main drawback of a competitive mechanism is that it does not satisfy ex post incentive compatibility:
in fact, it fails even weaker conditions such as Bayesian incentive compatibility. The main goal of this paper is to offer a mechanism that achieves an efficiency level arbitrarily close to a competitive mechanism, while satisfying ex post incentive compatibility and the other desirable properties.
2.2. The Groupwise-Price Double Auction Mechanism. The class of double auction mechanisms we examine is called the groupwise-price double auction mechanisms, or the groupwise-price mechanisms for short. A groupwise-price mechanism is defined as follows (because its formal definition is somewhat complicated, we provide an informal description following the formal definition).
(1) Let B be (randomly) partitioned into K sets B 1 , . . . , B K of equal size. Let S be (randomly) partitioned into K sets S 1 , . . . , S K of equal size.
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(2) Each agent i simultaneously reports type t i (not necessarily truthfully). Now, for each k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, the submarket k is composed of the set of agents
The trading procedure in this submarket is described as follows.
(
We call it the reference price for the submarket k in the sense explained below.
(4) Order the elements in B * k (t) in a decreasing manner in terms of the associated valuations v b (t), and the elements in S * k (t) in an increasing manner in terms of the associated valuations v s (t).
12 Let x = min{|B * k (t)|, |S * k (t)|}, and let B * * k (t) be the 10 If |B| is not a multiple of K, then find a largest integer z such that |B| ≥ zK, exclude |B| − zK buyers, and redefine B in the description of the mechanism as the set of the remaining buyers (and apply a similar redefinition to S as well). By modifying the mechanism in this way, all the results in the paper hold. In the rest of the paper, we assume |B| and |S| are multiples of K without loss. 11 The choice of the reference prices are crucial for asymptotic efficiency, as we will show in a subsequent section, while all other results hold for an arbitrary choice of the reference prices.
12 When the valuations of multiple agents are identical, we order them in some fixed order (where that order is independent of reported types).
set of the first x elements in B * k (t), and S * * k (t) be the set of first x elements in S *
if the set in the right hand side of this equation is nonempty, and lett b (t −b ) = 1 otherwise. Similarly, for each s ∈ S k and , definẽ
if the set in the right hand side of this equation is nonempty, and lett s (t −s ) = 0 otherwise.
Note that, by the single-crossing condition, once (b, ) ∈ B * *
is non-decreasing in . Similar properties hold for the sellers. 
13 Seller s sells the -th unit of the object if and only if (s, ) ∈ S * * k (t), and receives the price v s (t s (t −s ), t −s ) for that unit. As is clear in the description, each groupwise-price mechanism is identified by specifying the number of submarkets (groups), K, and the reference price for each submarket
In Section 3 we show that all the desirable properties except for asymptotic efficiency hold true for any choice of K and {p k (·)} K k=1 . In Section 4, we show asymptotic efficiency for a specific choice of them.
While the formal definition is somewhat involved, the basic idea is simple: divide the market into a number of submarkets (groups), and use group-specific prices (hence the name "groupwise-price mechanism"). Each submarket is composed of a subset of buyers and sellers, and all trades happen only between buyers and sellers in the same submarket.
For each submarket, we set a reference price for that submarket independently of reported types of agents in that submarket. In this way, we can prevent some obvious pricemanipulation incentives.
However, because the reference price in submarket k does not use any information about the agents' types in that submarket, it is possible that the reference price does not "clear" the demand and supply of that submarket. For example, the reference price may be so high that the number of units the sellers in S k want to sell is greater than the 13 Note that, if b trades the -th unit, then she necessarily trades the -th unit for every < as well.
If b receives units of the object in total, then her payment is
number of units the buyers in B k want to buy. Then, the mechanism runs a generalized VCG auction (Ausubel, 1999) separately for each side of the market to satisfy feasibility and non-wastefulness.
Another incentive issue we need to overcome is specific to interdependent-value double auction environments. Because a seller's type report can affect buyers' willingness to pay, the seller may have an incentive to overreport her type so that the buyers in the same submarket would buy more. Similarly, a buyer may have an incentive to underreport her type. Our mechanism eliminates such an incentive by defining B * k independent of any report by the sellers in submarket k, and similarly, defining S * k independent of any report by the buyers in submarket k.
By tailoring the detail in this manner, the mechanism satisfies a number of desirable properties (namely, ex post incentive compatibility, individual rationality, feasibility, nonwastefulness, and no budget deficit), but at a cost of efficiency through the following two channels. First, because the reference price in submarket k does not use any information about the agents' types in that submarket, some efficiency-enhancing trades within the submarket may be prevented. In Section 4, we will address this problem by increasing the number of submarkets and thus diminishing the effect of lost information for each submarket. Second, because we divide the market into (many) submarkets, some efficiency-enhancing trades across different submarkets may be prevented. Our technical contribution for analyzing efficiency is to find that there is an appropriate growth rate of the number of submarkets that balances out this tradeoff.
To illustrate how the mechanism works, we consider the following example. 
14 Although this example violates our assumptions that all valuations must lie in the unit interval and that v i = v i for each i and = , this is just for notational simplicity. We can modify the example to satisfy these assumptions without changing the conclusion.
Assume p k = 1.9. For the seller's side, we have |S * k (t)| = 2. We study how the trades and prices change as
If we gradually increase t b 1 from 0, then at t b 1 = 0.4, we have v
(t) = 1.9. Thus, for buyer b 1 to buy the second unit, t b 1 needs to be so high
Therefore, the price of each unit for buyer b 1 is the following: (0.9, t −b 1 ) = 2.3 for the second unit. In this example, one can verify that this mechanism satisfies ex post incentive compatibility, individual rationality, feasibility, non-wastefulness, and no budget deficit. In the next section, we show that these desirable properties hold generally under groupwise-price mechanisms.
Results with arbitrary number of buyers and sellers
In this section, we show that our groupwise-price mechanism has desirable properties introduced in Section 2.1. In particular, this mechanism is ex post incentive compatible.
Theorem 1. The groupwise-price mechanism satisfies
(1) ex post incentive compatibility,
(4) non-wastefulness, and (5) no budget deficit.
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Recall that all of the above properties are satisfied in Example 1. Theorem 1 shows that these properties hold generally under groupwise-price mechanisms.
15 The mechanism can be easily modified to satisfy budget balance as well if we specify any agent (possibly randomly) as a residual claimant at the beginning of the mechanism. See Section 4.1 for detail.
Proof. Ex post incentive compatibility and individual rationality. We consider only the case of buyers, but a similar argument applies to the case of sellers as well.
Then, for each ≤ ,
and for each > ,
If the buyer b reports truthfully, then her utility is
which is nonnegative, showing individual rationality. Moreover, the inequalities above imply that misreporting b's type does not increase her utility, demonstrating ex post incentive compatibility.
Feasibility and Non-wastefulness. Suppose that |B *
In this case, the number of units sold is |S * * k (t)| = |S * k (t)|, and the number of units bought is |B * *
while the number of units bought is |B * * k (t)| = |B * k (t)|. Thus, we have shown both feasibility and non-wastefulness.
No budget deficit. By construction, for any b, , t, if (b, ) ∈ B * * k (t) so that b trades her -th unit, then the price she pays for that unit is
Similarly, for any s, , t, if (s, ) ∈ S * * k (t) so that s trades -th unit, then the price she receives for that unit is
Therefore, given the feasibility and non-wastefulness established above, the total monetary transfer from the buyers is no smaller than the total monetary transfer to the sellers, implying that the groupwise-price mechanism runs no budget deficit. This completes the proof.
Approximate efficiency
Next, we show that the double-auction mechanism constructed in the previous section approximates an efficient allocation as the number of market participants goes to infinity.
In this section, we additionally assume the following. First, there are equal numbers N of buyers and sellers, i.e., n B = n S = N . Buyers have the same valuation function to one another (but, of course, the actual valuation can differ because of different type realizations) and similarly for sellers.
j∈B\{i} is a permutation of (t j ) j∈B\{i} and (t j ) j∈S is a permutation of (t j ) j∈S . We impose a similar symmetry condition for each seller as well.
Also, there exists a constant α ≥ 0 such that, for every sufficiently large market size N , any pair of agents i and j = i, any index ∈ {1, . . . , m}, and any t j , t j , t −j , we have
The relation (4.1) implies that the influence of any one agent's type on another agent's utility becomes small in large markets.
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Finally, there exist β and β with β ≥ β > 0 such that, for every sufficiently large market size N , any pair of agents i and j = i on the same side of the market (i.e., both i and j are buyers, or both are sellers), any index ∈ {1, . . . , m}, and any t,
2) requires that a difference in types has a first-order effect on the values. The part |v i (t) − v j (t)| ≤ β |t i − t j | in (4.2) requires that two persons with similar types have similar values.
If the valuation functions are differentiable, the following conditions (i) and (ii) together imply (4.1) and (4.2): (i) for any N , and for any pair of agents i and j = i, any index ∈ {1, . . . , m}, and all t,
and (ii) there exit δ and δ with δ ≥ δ > 0 such that, for any N , any agent i, any index ∈ {1, . . . , m}, and all t,
16 Of course, it does not mean that the interdependence vanishes away in large markets. Agent i's value can vary with t −i in a non-negligible manner even in a large market, even though the effect of each single t j , j = i, is vanishing. 
) for some constant γ ∈ (0, 1), and that, for some δ ≥ δ > 0,
Moreover, for any b = b,
thus condition (4.3) is satisfied with respect to α = 2δ γ. Recall, then, that (4.3) and (4.4) imply (4.1) and (4.2).
Another example is an environment with "unobservable fundamentals". Let θ ∈ Θ be an unobservable variable that affects every agent's valuation, and assume that each agent i's value for the -th unit trade is a function of only t i and θ, which we denote by w i (t i , θ). We also assume that each type t i is identically and independently distributed conditional on θ, where the conditional distribution of t i given θ is assumed to be common knowledge. Then, v i (t) can be defined as the conditional expectation of w i (t i , θ) given
uniformly over [0, 1] , and w i (t i , θ) = t i + θ. Given θ, t i is independently distributed with 17 It is straightforward that (4.3) implies (4.1). For (4.2), observe that
2) is satisfied for any sufficiently large N by taking β = δ 2 and β = δ .
], and g(t i |θ) = 2θ for t i ∈ ( 
Therefore, for each j = i, any t, and any = 1, . . . , m, we have |v
, and v i (t) − v j (t) = t i −t j , and thus, both of the conditions (4.1) and (4.2) are satisfied.
In this section, we show that our groupwise-price mechanism approximates an efficient allocation as N goes to infinity. As before, let t i ∈ [0, 1] denote agent i's type, and we assume that each t b , t s are drawn according to an i.i.d. uniform distribution.
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In this setting, we specialize our groupwise-price mechanism by providing a particular procedure to set the parameters, namely, the number of submarkets K and the reference prices (p 1 , . . . , p K ), as follows. We call the resulting mechanism the canonical groupwise-price mechanism.
• Set K to be an integer depending on N such that K → ∞ and buyers and a sellers.
• Given reported t,
, and letv
B be the q-th highest value among {v b (t k )} b∈B, , andv (q) S be the q-th lowest value among {v s (t k )} s∈S, .
18 Note that
where, for the denominator,
and similarly, for the numerator,
. Therefore, E(θ|t) = The reference price in submarket k, p k , is given by
where q is an integer such thatv
21 Note that we include all buyers and sellers in computing p k .
We define asymptotic efficiency in terms of trade outcomes. We say that a mechanism is asymptotically efficient if the ex ante non-monetary payoff of each agent in that mechanism approaches that in a competitive mechanism, i.e., as N goes to infinity, for
, where ζ denotes the object allocation rule of our mechanism, and ζ * denotes that of a competitive mechanism. In this sense, the trade outcome in the mechanism becomes "arbitrarily close" to the first-best level in large economies.
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Theorem 2. The canonical groupwise-price mechanism is asymptotically efficient.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The formal proof of this result is involved, so we offer some intuition here while deferring the proof to the Appendix. To get the first intuition, recall that our groupwise-price mechanism sets a reference price p k for each submarket k. This suggests that most mutually beneficial trades can be realized if the reference prices approximate the market clearing price in large economies.
However, whether this intuition goes through is far from obvious. More specifically, there are at least two challenges. First, the reference price for a submarket must be independent of reported types of agents in that submarket in order to keep ex post incentive compatibility of the mechanism. This implies that the relevant information from agents in a submarket should be ignored when setting that submarket's reference price. This poses a problem, because the reference price does not converge to the market-clearing price even in a large market if private information from too many agents is ignored. Second, even if the reference prices are close to the market-clearing prices, additional efficiency loss can occur because agents in a submarket can trade only with those in the same submarket. This can prevent some beneficial trades from happening between agents in different submarkets.
S . 22 Recall that our mechanism may generate budget surplus while a competitive mechanism balances the budget. Hence the difference in the ex ante "total" (i.e., the sum of monetary and non-monetary) payoffs may not vanish. Section 4.1 studies this issue and offers possible solutions to obtain stronger convergence results.
Our proof shows that inefficiencies from both of these sources can be appropriately bounded. Regarding the first challenge, our approach is to divide the market into a sufficiently large number of submarkets. Doing so makes the effect of ignoring types of one submarket for calculating reference prices negligible in large markets, by which we show that the reference prices approximate a market-clearing price in large economies (with high probability). Regarding the second challenge, our approach is to keep the number of submarkets sufficiently small, so that the number of beneficial trades prevented from happening across different submarkets is sufficiently small. Clearly, there is a potential conflict between these two approaches. Our formal proof shows that there is an appropriate growth rate of the number of submarkets such that these conflicting forces can be balanced in such a way that both challenges are addressed. The existence of such a growth rate is not obvious, and we refer interested readers to the proof in Appendix A.
Remark 2. The i.i.d. uniform distribution assumption of agent types can be relaxed in several directions. First, as mentioned in footnote 19, it is straightforward to extend our result to the case where buyer types are drawn from a non-atomic full support distribution over some intervals, and similarly for seller types. In fact, the result can be further generalized to environments with some correlation of types. To see this point, consider a model in which there is a state variable σ that is drawn randomly from a certain finite distribution. For each realization of σ, there is a pair of type distributions, one for the buyers and another for the sellers, and types are independently distributed conditional on σ. It is clear that our result generalizes to this model because the expected efficiency loss is simply a weighted average of expected inefficiencies conditional on σ. Because our proof shows that expected inefficiency goes to zero for any fixed σ, we conclude that the expected inefficiency that is averaged over the state variables also converges to zero. 4.1. Asymptotic Budget Balance. In the preceding section, we have established that the trading pattern of the objects converges to an efficient one under the canonical groupwise-price mechanism. However, this does not imply that the expected payoff of each agent converges to the efficient level in the competitive mechanism, because a groupwiseprice mechanism can run budget surplus. Unless the budget surplus is included in the welfare, this implies that the welfare level including transfer in groupwise-price mechanisms can be lower than that in a competitive equilibrium.
To present a formal analysis on this issue, we begin by defining asymptotic budget balance. A mechanism ϕ = (ζ, τ ) is asymptotically budget-balanced if
This condition ensures that the per-capita budget imbalance converges to zero in expectation as the market size approaches infinity.
The following example shows that even the canonical groupwise-price mechanism can violate asymptotic budget balance.
Example 2. Suppose m = 2, the values for each seller s is given by v 1 s (t) = t s and v 2 s (t) = t s + 2, and the values for each buyer b are given by v b (t) = t b + 1 for both = 1, 2 (thus, agents in this example have private values).
23 Note that, for each seller, the value of her first unit of the object is in [0, 1], and the value for the second unit is in [2, 3] .
Thus, for the sellers, there is a "gap" between possible values of the first and second units of the object.
Consider the canonical groupwise-price mechanism. By the definition of the reference price, with a large N , it is very likely that p k is close to 1.5 for each k. The probability that |B * k (t)| < a is bounded away from zero even if N goes to infinity. On the other hand, the probability that |S * k (t)| = a approaches one. Thus, the probability that the sellers in submarket k are on the long side of the market, i.e., |S * k (t)| > |B * k (t)|, is bounded away from zero. In such a case, each seller who trades earns at most 1, while each buyer who trades pays p k . Since at least a fraction of agents bounded away from zero trade in expectation, and p k is higher than 1.5 with probability bounded away from zero, this implies that the expected budget surplus per capita does not converge to zero as N → ∞. That is, the canonical groupwise-price mechanism is not asymptotically budgetbalanced.
This example shows that the groupwise-price mechanism does not necessarily achieve asymptotic budget balance. However, as we present below, there are at least two approaches that enable us to have the mechanism achieve asymptotic budget balance, thereby enabling each agent to asymptotically enjoy the same level of ex ante expected utility as in a competitive equilibrium.
One solution is to randomly choose one agent independently from agents' reports and give all the budget surplus to that agent while prohibiting her from trading. In other words, we can achieve asymptotic efficiency by augmenting the canonical groupwise-price 23 Although this example violates our assumptions that all valuations must lie in the unit interval and that v i = v i for each i and = , this is just for notational simplicity. We can modify the example to satisfy these assumptions without changing the conclusion. mechanism by exogenously appointing one revenue absorber. By construction, this modified mechanism is budget-balanced. Moreover, it is easy to verify that the above modification does not invalidate any of our preceding results so all other desirable properties of the original mechanism continue to hold.
Nevertheless, it is conceivable that a social planner does not want to use a revenue absorber.
24 This concern motivates the second solution. Let us begin by imposing an additional assumption. We say that agent valuations allow no gaps if
. , m}, and t ∈ [0, 1]
B∪S . This assumption may be interpreted as imposing certain "smoothness" of supply and demand functions. Note that the sellers' valuations in Example 2 violate this requirement.
Theorem 3. Suppose that agent valuations allow no gaps. Then, the canonical groupwiseprice mechanism is asymptotically budget-balanced.
Proof. See Appendix B.
An immediate corollary of Theorems 2 and 3 is a stronger form of asymptotic efficiency.
More specifically, the ex-ante expected utility of each buyer and seller converges to the level achieved with a competitive mechanism under truthtelling as the market size approaches infinity.
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Conclusion
This paper proposed a new double auction mechanism, the groupwise-price mechanism.
We showed that it satisfies ex post incentive compatibility, individual rationality, feasibility, non-wastefulness, and no budget deficit. Moreover, the canonical groupwise-price mechanism satisfies asymptotic efficiency. To our knowledge, our mechanism is the first double auction mechanism with these properties in the interdependent values setting.
There are a number of possible directions of future research. One possibility is to examine the speed of convergence (i.e., how quickly efficiency is approximated), or the 24 For instance, agents' payoff functions may fail to be quasi-linear (which we assume throughout the paper) because of income effect if the monetary transfer is large. Under income effect, agents' payoffs may exhibit risk aversion, and hence randomly awarding one agent with a large amount of money may be inefficient. 25 Strictly speaking, the statement of Theorem 3 merely states that the aggregate budget surplus per capita vanishes, and is silent about the distribution of transfer across different agents. However, the proof of the theorem reveals that each agent's transfer converges to its competitive level. This fact and Theorem 2 imply this corollary.
possibility of a stronger form of asymptotic efficiency (e.g., whether efficiency in the "absolute term" is possible, rather than in the "per-capita term" as in this paper). These issues appear to be technically challenging exercises. 26 We leave them as topics for future research.
Another direction is to consider more general environments, such as those with multidimensional signals, 27 multiple types of objects, complementarity in agents' valuations, dispensing with the assumption that each agent is predetermined to be a buyer or a seller (that is, allowing agents to buy or sell depending on signals and prices), and so on.
Generalizations in these directions are not straightforward, and we leave them for future research. However, we believe that some intuitions obtained in our study may be useful in designing desirable mechanisms in these more general environments.
26 Measuring efficiency in the per-capita term is standard in the literature, especially with interdependence. For example, see Reny and Perry (2006) . 27 In the one-sided, object allocation setting, a recent contribution by Hashimoto (2013) obtains positive results even with multi-dimensional signals. Although there does not appear to be an obvious way to adapt his idea to our double-auction setting, studying multidimensional signals in double auction would be an important future research.
Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 2
Lemma 1 shows that, by a law of large numbers, the sup-norm distance between the empirical cdf of types and the true cdf of types in each submarket k is small in an event that occurs with a high probability. Focusing on that event, Lemmas 2 to 5 evaluate how many efficiency-enhancing trades are left unrealized. Building on these lemmas, we complete the proof by bounding the overall expected efficiency loss.
We first look at each submarket k. Let Λ = K, and consider λ ∈ {1, . . . , Λ}.
Let
and
, and Y λ k is a binomially distributed variable, with means and variances as follows.
Let E k be the event that all of the following four inequalities hold,
By Chebyshev's inequality, we obtain the following.
Proof. By Chebyshev's inequality, for each λ,
. Because the probability of the union of events is weakly smaller than the sum of the probabilities of those events by Boole's inequality, these inequalities imply
, we obtain the desired conclusion. Now, consider the event F that v i (t) = v j (t) for every , , i, j such that = or i = j. Because types are drawn i.i.d. from the uniform distribution on [0, 1], F is a probability one event. From this and the fact that there are K submarkets, we have
as N goes to infinity, this probability converges to one.
We observe that the overall type distributions satisfy similar properties. Let
Lemma 2. Given that E has occurred, we have
for every λ ∈ {1, . . . , Λ}.
Proof. Given that E k has occurred,
Thus, given that E = k E k has occurred,
We obtain the desired conclusions about X λ , Y λ , and Y λ by symmetric arguments.
Given reported t, let v (q)
B be the q-th highest value among {v b (t)} b∈B, , and v
(q)
S be the q-th lowest value among {v s (t)} s∈S, . Let p M C be a market-clearing price, defined as
where q is an integer such that v 
In the remainder of the proof, we show that the level of trades approaches an efficient level as N → ∞, implying that per-capita inefficiency caused by failed trades converges to zero. By ex ante symmetry across buyers and across sellers, this suffices for the proof of the theorem.
Proof. Let D 0 and S 0 be the demand and supply under the true type profile at price p M C , and let D (p) and S (p) be the demand and supply under the modified type profile (i.e.,
Because the demand under the modified type profile is weakly larger than the one under the true type profile, we have
On the other hand, the supply under the modified type profile is weakly smaller, and hence
In the rest of this proof, we shall show
S . 29 Hence, for example, if there is no type of the seller who trades exactly two units, we have t s 2 = t s 3 .
In the following, we first show that
Then, we show that this implies the desired inequality (A.1).
We first consider sellers. For each , define S (p k ) = |{s ∈ S|v s (t k ) <p k }| and S 0 = |{s ∈ S|v s (t) < p M C }|. We shall show that S (p k ) ≥ S 0 . To show this, consider the following cases.
(1) Suppose
(3) Suppose S 0 > 0 and S (p k ) < N . We first show the following claim.
. Take s ∈ S as the seller whose type is the highest among the sellers s with v s (t) < p M C . Then
; Note that such a seller s exists because of the assumption S 0 > 0.
Consider the following cases.
(a) Suppose s / ∈ S k . In this case, for anys ∈ S k , we have
Because the modified type fors ∈ S k att k is the highest possible type by the definition oft k , the above inequality implies S (p k ) = N , a contradiction.
(b) Suppose s ∈ S k . In this case, we have
Thus, we obtain S (p k ) = N , a contradiction.
To prove the desired conclusion S (p k ) ≥ S 0 for this case, let s ∈ S be the seller whose type is the lowest among those with v s (t k ) ≥p k ; Note that such a seller s exists because S (p k ) < N . Consider the following cases.
(a) Suppose s / ∈ S k . Letλ S (p k ) be an integer such that the interval [λ
contains the type of the seller whose valuation att k is the highest among those whose value att k is lower thanp k . By event E, we have t s ∈ [λ
31 The first inequality of the display inequalities below is obtained as follows: letting s / ∈ S k be an
Then, we have
)N , and thus,
. This inequality is satisfied because
by Claim 1, and hence 1 −
.
Hence we have shown that
To complete the proof, consider the following cases.
Lemma 4. Assume E holds. In the canonical groupwise-price mechanism, at least
units of the object are traded.
Proof. For each b ∈ B k and ∈ {1, . . . , m},
Let λ be the smallest nonnegative integer that satisfies
Then, by rearranging terms,
Consider an arbitrary buyer b ∈ y λ k . Using the above inequality, and noting that
Because λ is defined as the smallest integer satisfying (A.3), we have
Substituting this inequality to inequality (A.4), we obtain
For each s ∈ S k and ∈ {1, . . . , m},
thenṽ s < p k , and hence (s, ) ∈ S * k (t). Let λ be defined as the largest integer such that
Consider an arbitrary seller s ∈ x λ k . Using the above equality, and noting t s < t s (because
thus showing that relation (A.5) holds, and hence (s, ) ∈ S * k (t). So we obtain
Because λ is defined as the largest integer satisfying (A.6), we have
Substituting this inequality into inequality (A.7), we obtain
Therefore, the number of trades in submarket k is at least
Summing across all submarkets (and noting that this lower bound does not depend on k), there are at least
trades under our double auction mechanism.
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Lemma 5. Assume E holds. In the efficient allocation, under p M C , at most
units are traded.
Proof. First, consider the buyers. By definition, if buyer b satisfies ).
Therefore the number of the buyers who buy their -th units of the object is bounded from above by
).
Next, consider the sellers. By definition, if seller s satisfies ).
Therefore the number of the sellers who buy their -th units of the object is bounded from above by N (
Therefore the number of trades is at most min{
32 Note that
which completes the proof. Now we shall complete the proof of the Theorem. By Lemmata 4 and 5, the "per-capita" welfare loss is bounded from above by
where the inequality follows because Pr(E) ≤ 1 (since Pr(E) is a probability) and (1 − Pr(E)) is bounded from above by replacing Pr(E) with its lower bound, 1 − This implies that the per-capita inefficiency from failed trades also approaches zero as N → ∞, completing the proof.
Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 3
In the following, we fix one realization of type profile t under event E. Let [
be the interval that contains the highest type of the sellers in S whose -th unit value given t is smaller than or equal to p. Similarly, Let [
) be the interval that contains the lowest type of the buyers in B whose -th unit value given t is higher than or equal to p.
Also, we use the following notation.
At a fixed submarket k, we introduce analogous notation. Let [
) be the interval that contains the highest type of the sellers in S k whose -th unit value givent is smaller than or equal to p. Similarly, let [
) be the interval that contains the lowest type of the buyers in B k whose -th unit value given t is higher than or equal to p. Also, let
Under event E, A
). Let S k (p) and D k (p) denote the supply and demand functions in submarket k, i.e., S k (p) = |{(s, )|v s (t) < p}|, and
Lemma 6. Let
To do so, for any , let S k (q k ) be the number of the sellers who supply their 'th unit at q k , corresponding to S k (q k ). Similarly, let S 0 be the number of the sellers who supply their 'th unit at p M C , corresponding to S 0 . Then, for any given ,
(1) Suppose that v s (t) ≤ q k for all s. Then every seller in S k supplies her 'th unit at
(2) Suppose that v s (t) ≥ p M C for all s. Then no seller in S supplies her 'th unit at
(3) Suppose that neither of the above cases holds. Let s be the seller whose type is the lowest among those in submarket k with v s (t) > q k , and s ∈ S be the seller whose type is the highest among those in the entire market with v s (t) < p M C (such s and s exist by the assumption of this case). Then,
Depending on the realization t, t s is either in [
which implies
This implies
By the conclusions of the above cases,
thus we obtain
With an analogous argument, we can show
as well. These inequalities, together with the relation S 0 = D 0 , imply the desired
The proof for D k (q k ) > S k (q k ) is analogous and hence omitted.
The following lemma is useful for the rest of the proof. 
Proof. Let s ∈ S k be the seller who has the lowest type in S k , and s ∈ S k be the seller who has the highest type in S k .
Proof for a lower bound for S k (·). We consider the following two cases. First, suppose that there exists ∈ {1, . . . , m} such that v s (t) < p ≤ p ≤ v s (t). Let s ∈ S k be the seller in submarket k whose type is the highest among those with v s (t) < p. Then,
Similarly, let s ∈ S k be the seller in submarket k whose type is the lowest among those with v s (t) ≥ p . s has the next lowest type above the type of the seller, say s , who is the highest type with value less than p , and t s is at most
Therefore, by event E, there should be at least one seller within each interval of length , which implies
where the first inequality follows from the definition of λ S k (p ) and event E, the equality follows from calculation, the second inequality follows from inequalities (B.2) and (B.3), and the last inequality follows because
by assumption on p, p , s, and s as well as condition (4.2) in the main text.
Next, suppose that there exists no ∈ {1, . . . , m} such that v s (t) < p ≤ p ≤ v s (t). Let and s be defined by:
That is, and s satisfy v s (t) ≥ p and the pair ( , s ) is the smallest of such pairs with respect to the lexicographic order that relies first on the index and then on the agent's type. Similarly, let and s be = max{˜ ∈ {1, . . . , m}|v˜ s (t) < p},
That is, ( , s) is the largest index-seller pair satisfying v s (t) < p with respect to the lexicographic oder described above. The relation ≥ contradicts the assumption that there exists no ∈ {1, . . . , m} such that v s (t) < p ≤ p ≤ v s (t), so > . Hence,
where the first inequality follows from the definitions of p, p , s , , s, and , the second inequality follows because the "no gap" condition implies
for each˜ ∈ { , + 1, . . . , − 1}, the third inequality follows because, under event E,
, and hence,
by assumption (4.2) in the main text, 33 and for each˜ ∈ { + 1, . . . , − 1},
and the last inequality follows by definitions of p, p , , s, , s , and by assumption (4.2) in the main text. Rearranging terms, we obtain
Therefore,
where the term a( − − 1) in the first line corresponds to the supply of the objects from all agents in submarket K for the ( + 1)th, ..., ( − 1)th units, the first inequality follows 33 We obtain those inequalities as follows.
where, for example, v s (t s , 0, t −s,s ) represents the value of s for -th unit when her own type is 0, the type of s is t s , and the types of the others are t −s,s , and similarly for the other expressions. Similarly, we obtain
from the definition of λ S k (p ) and event E, the second inequality follows from calculation, the third inequality follows from inequality (B.4), the equality follows from calculation, and the fourth inequality follows from the fact − ≤ m.
Proof for an upper bound for S k (·). To obtain an upper bound on the difference in supplies, let L := { ∈ {1, . . . , m}|v s (t) < p and v s (t) ≥ p}. We shall first show
for each ∈ L. To show this, let s ∈ S k be the seller in submarket k whose type is the highest among those with v s (t) ≤ p , and s ∈ S k be the seller in submarket k whose type is the lowest among those with v s (t) > p; Note that such s and s exist since ∈ L. Then,
). Hence,
Consider / ∈ L. Suppose first that v s (t) ≥ p . Then by assumption p ≥ p it follows that v s (t) ≥ p, and hence no seller in S k supplies the -th unit of the object under either p or p . Suppose next that v s (t) < p. Then by assumption p ≥ p it follows that v s (t) < p , and hence every seller in S k supplies the -th unit of the object under both p and p .
We now show
). To show this, applying inequality (B.5) and the above argument we obtain
Proof for a lower bound for D k (·). Let b ∈ B k be the seller who has the lowest type in B k , and b ∈ B k be the seller who has the highest type in B k . We consider the following two cases.
First, suppose that there exists ∈ {1, . . . , m} such that
b ∈ B k be the seller in submarket k whose type is the lowest among those with v b (t) ≥ p .
Then we obtain the following inequality:
Similarly, let b ∈ B k be the seller in submarket k whose type is the highest among those with v b (t) < p. Then, the following inequality follows:
where the first inequality follows from the definition of λ B k (p ), the equality follows from calculation, the second inequality follows from inequalities (B.6) and (B. ) is defined as the interval that contains the lowest type of the buyers in B k whose -th unit value given t is higher than or equal to p .
35 To obtain this inequality, recall that t b is the type just below the lowest type of the buyers in B k whose -th unit value given t is higher than or equal to p, and the latter type is in the interval That is, ( , b) is the largest index-seller pair satisfying v b (t) < p with respect to the lexicographic oder described above. The relation ≥ contradicts the assumption that there exists no ∈ {1, . . . , m} such that v b (t) < p ≤ p ≤ v b (t), so > . Hence,
where the first inequality follows from the definitions of p, p , b , , b, and , the second inequality follows because the "smoothness" assumption implies , and hence,
by assumption (4.2) in the main text, for each˜ ∈ { + 1, . . . , − 1}, 
where the term a( − − 1) in the first line corresponds to the supply of the objects from all agents in submarket K for the ( + 1)th, ..., ( − 1)th units, the first inequality follows from the definition of λ B k (p ), the second inequality follows from calculation, the third inequality follows from inequality (B.8), the equality follows from calculation, and the fourth inequality follows from the fact − ≤ m.
Proof for an upper bound for D k (·). To obtain an upper bound on the difference in demands, let L := { ∈ {1, . . . , m}|v b (t) < p and v b (t) ≥ p}. We shall first show
for each ∈ L. To show this, let b ∈ B k be the seller in submarket k whose type is the highest among those with v b (t) < p , and b ∈ B k be the seller in submarket k whose type is the lowest among those with v b (t) ≥ p; Note that such b and b exist since ∈ L. Then,
Consider / ∈ L. Suppose first that v b (t) ≥ p . Then by assumption p ≥ p it follows that v b (t) ≥ p, and hence every buyer in B k demands the -th unit of the object under both p and p . Suppose next that v b (t) < p. Then by assumption p ≥ p it follows that v b (t) < p , and hence no buyer in B k demands the -th unit of the object) under either p or p .
). To show this, applying inequality (B.9) and the above argument we obtain
Lemma 7 has an implication for the shape of the inverse demand and supply functions. 
where the first inequality follows from Lemma 8, the second inequality follows from 7, and the last inequality follows from the definitions ofq k and q k . Therefore, it converges to zero as the market size grows.
Similarly,
where the first inequality follows from Lemma 8, the second inequality follows from Lemma 7, and the last inequality follows from the definitions ofq k and q k . Therefore, it converges to zero as the market size grows. These show the desired conclusion.
